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      <title>Science-plaining reality to the humanities: the case against emergence</title>
      <link>/posts/emergence/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 12:00:00 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>/posts/emergence/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Yesterday, in an after-class discussion with a student, I found myself questioning the value of the concept of emergence, and the way it is embraced not just by complexity theorists but by the sciences at large. Today I found some time to think through the argument a bit more and then boom, this blog post EMERGED.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short, I feel that the idea of emergence, and much of complexity theory in general, is just a form of &amp;ldquo;science-plaining&amp;rdquo;, where science invents its own jargon to &amp;ldquo;explain&amp;rdquo; to the humanities (and people at large) what they have known for centuries, while maintaining the untenable position that it &amp;ldquo;objectively describes the world&amp;rdquo;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content>&lt;p&gt;Yesterday, in an after-class discussion with a student, I found myself questioning the value of the concept of emergence, and the way it is embraced not just by complexity theorists but by the sciences at large. Today I found some time to think through the argument a bit more and then boom, this blog post EMERGED.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short, I feel that the idea of emergence, and much of complexity theory in general, is just a form of &amp;ldquo;science-plaining&amp;rdquo;, where science invents its own jargon to &amp;ldquo;explain&amp;rdquo; to the humanities (and people at large) what they have known for centuries, while maintaining the untenable position that it &amp;ldquo;objectively describes the world&amp;rdquo;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If you ask people to explain emergence, they often mention things like &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway%27s_Game_of_Life&#34;&gt;the game of life&lt;/a&gt; or dynamics of &lt;a href=&#34;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starling#Murmuration&#34;&gt;murmuration&lt;/a&gt;. The point is that these are systems that behave in a way that would have been very hard to predict on the basis of its separate constitutive parts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What interests me here is not so much the claim that things behave in surprising ways (we don&amp;rsquo;t need science to tell us this), but the scientific suggestion that this is somehow a feature of the &lt;em&gt;system&lt;/em&gt;, rather than (also) the result of scientists&amp;rsquo; positionality (e.g. their situated cognitive (in)abilities).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Other people would explain emergence by pointing out how, when you put these things together in a particular way, at some point, a &lt;em&gt;qualitatively different thing&lt;/em&gt; appears.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here again, what interests me is not so much the idea that &amp;ldquo;stuff put together differently behaves differently&amp;rdquo; - we don&amp;rsquo;t need science to tell us this - but the insistence that this &amp;ldquo;qualitative shift&amp;rdquo; is somehow a inherent feature of the system, rather than (also) the result of the way &lt;em&gt;scientists&lt;/em&gt; decide what is a &lt;em&gt;qualitative&lt;/em&gt; change and what is not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, people often defend the idea of emergence by arguing that in cases of emergence &amp;ldquo;the whole is more than the sum of parts&amp;rdquo;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Again, I feel that we don&amp;rsquo;t need scientists to tell us that putting things together in a particular way can make a big difference. I think most people would recognize that before you put the parts together, they were already part of other &amp;ldquo;wholes&amp;rdquo;. And that when you take them out of those wholes, and put them together as one new whole, you create a different &amp;ldquo;whole&amp;rdquo;, which will differ from the other &amp;ldquo;wholes&amp;rdquo;. If this is emergence, then emergence is everywhere, which would make it a rather useless concept.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My hypothesis&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; is that scientists are in a way explaining basic reality to themselves, because they have lost touch with the fact that the world is fundamentally &lt;em&gt;relational&lt;/em&gt;. As the idea of a pure experiment requires them to isolate their research objects from the context, they have made themselves believe that it is actually &lt;em&gt;possible&lt;/em&gt; to do so. While in reality, nothing ever exists outside of its context. The best you can do - e.g. in a lab - is to try to keep the context more or less &lt;em&gt;similar&lt;/em&gt; in space and time. This ontological confusion makes them think that emergence is something special. After all, it&amp;rsquo;s only when you think of the world as made up of isolated things, that you can conceptually distinguish the whole from the sum of parts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To be clear, I am not saying that the flocking behaviour of starlings is not amazing, or that the game of life is not mesmerizing. I just think that the cases scientists (rather arbitrarily) single out as &amp;ldquo;emergence&amp;rdquo; are less rare than they think, and that what excites them about emergence has been recognized and studied by - with other words - for centuries: by philosopohers, writers, poets, humanities scholars, you name it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Having said all of that, maybe I shouldn&amp;rsquo;t get so worked up about this. If it takes some fancy jargon for scientists to admit that some things are unpredictable, so be it. And if it - on top of that - helps them to recognize that stuff put together differently behaves differently, great.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Just don&amp;rsquo;t come and talk to me about how the sciences are this purely objective counterpart to the fundamentally subjective humanities and social sciences. And share some of your research funding please.&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;p&gt;These are of course not solely my own thoughts. Like everything, my thoughts are constituted by many things, the majority of which lies firmly outside of my control 🥲.&amp;#160;&lt;a href=&#34;#fnref:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-backref&#34; role=&#34;doc-backlink&#34;&gt;&amp;#x21a9;&amp;#xfe0e;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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